Risky Investments with Limited Commitment by Cooley, Thomas et al.
Risky Investments with Limited Commitment∗
Thomas Cooley† Ramon Marimon ‡ Vincenzo Quadrini§
October 28, 2013
Abstract
Over the last three decades there has been a dramatic increase in the size of the
financial sector and in the compensation of financial executives. This increase has
been associated with greater risk-taking and the use of more complex financial in-
struments. Parallel to this trend, the organizational structure of the financial sector
has changed with the traditional partnership replaced by public companies. The or-
ganizational change has increased the competition for managerial talent, which may
have weakened the commitment between investors and managers. We show how
increased competition and the weaker commitment can raise the managerial incen-
tives to undertake risky investment. In the general equilibrium, this change results
in higher risk-taking, a larger and more productive financial sector with greater in-
come inequality (within and across sectors), and a lower market valuation of financial
institutions.
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1 Introduction
The past several decades have been characterized by dramatic changes in the size and
structure of financial firms in the United States and elsewhere. What was once an in-
dustry dominated by partnerships has evolved into a much more concentrated sector
dominated by large public firms. In this paper we argue that this evolution has altered
the structure of contractual arrangements between investors and managers in ways that
weakened commitment and increased the managers’ incentives to undertake risky invest-
ments. At the aggregate level, the change resulted in a larger financial sector and greater
income inequality.
The increase in the size and importance of the financial sector in the United States
has been documented by Phillipon (2008) and Phillipon and Resheff (2009).1 This is also
shown in Figure 1 which plots the shares of the financial industry in value added and
employment since 1970. The contribution of the finance industry to GDP doubled in size
between 1970 and 2011. The share of employment has also increased but by less than
the contribution to value added. This is especially noticeable starting in the mid 1980s
when the share of employment stopped growing while the share of value added continued
to expand. Accordingly, we observe a significant increase in productivity compared to
the remaining sectors of the economy.
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Figure 1: Share of Value Added and Employment
The increase in size was also associated with a sharp increase in compensation.
Clementi and Cooley (2009) show that between 1993 and 2006 the average compen-
sation levels of CEOs in the financial sector increased from parity with other sectors of
1Phillipon and Resheff (2013) also study the growth of finance in a cross section of countries and find
that the share of the financial sector in many of them is signficantly hgher today than at any point in
the past century.
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the economy to nearly double. At the same time compensation of managers became more
unequal in the financial sector. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the income share of the
top 5% of managerial positions in the sector compared to other occupations.
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Figure 2: Share of the top 5%
This period of increased size and importance of the financial sector followed significant
changes in the organizational form of financial firms—especially the transformation from
partnerships to public corporations—that had two important effects. The first was to
increase competition in the financial sector raising the demand for managers. The second
was to alter the structure of contractual arrangements between investors and managers
in ways that weakened commitments. As we will see, the combination of these two effects
increased the managers’ incentives to undertake risky investments and generated greater
income inequality within and between sectors.
Historically, it was common for investment firms to be organized as partnerships.
Many argued that this was a preferred form of organization because in a partnership,
managers and investors were the same people and it was the partners own assets that were
at risk when risky investments were taken. Effectively, the separation between ownership
and investment control is minimized, reducing the agency issues. Public companies,
on the other hand, are organizational structures with significant separation between
ownership (shareholders) and investment control (managers), and it is well understood
that this organizational form is characterized by significant agency issues.2
Until 1970 the New York Stock Exchange prohibited member firms from being public
companies. When the organizational restriction on financial companies was relaxed,
2This is largely consistent with the literature on incomplete contract theory. According to Grossman
and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), more efficient organizational forms are those where the
agents who control the investment surplus own a larger share of the assets.
2
there was a movement to go public and partnerships began to disappear. Merrill Lynch
went public in 1971, followed by Bear Stearns in 1985, Morgan Stanley in 1985, Lehman
Brothers in 1994 and Goldman Sachs in 1999. Other venerable investment banks were
taken public and either absorbed by commercial banks or converted to bank holding
companies. Today, there are very few patnerships remaining and they are small. The
same evolution occurred in Britain where the closed ownership Merchant Banks virtually
disappeared.3
The partnership form and its customs had some important implications for managerial
mobility. The capital in a partnership and the ownership shares are typically relatively
illiquid so it was difficult for partners to liquidate their ownership positions and move to
other firms. Also important is the process of becoming a partner. In the typical firm,
new professionals are hired as associates and, after a trial period, they are either chosen
to be partners or released. In this environment separation is viewed as a signal of inferior
performance, thus affecting the external option of a financial professional. Becoming a
partner, on the other hand, represented a firm commitment to continued employment
on the part of the other partners. The transition to corporations, however, changed
significantly the nature of contracts and competition in the financial sector.4
As the structure of financial firms changed, so did the market valuation of them. The
market does not seem to value highly large complex financial institutions. Figure 3 shows
the evolution of the ratio of average market value of equity to book value of equity for
publicly listed financial and nonfinancial firms since 1970 and shows that, starting in the
early 1980’s, the market valuation of financial firms has been flat while for nonfinancial
firms it has continued to grow. The fact that the market values the financial sector
relatively less, compared to the rest of the economy, may be a reflection of compensation
practices in firms where managers retain so much of the surplus.5
In sum, we have emphasized four changes that are associated with the evolution of
the financial sector from a partnership form of organization to public corporations: (i)
greater risk-taking; (ii) a larger and more productive financial sector; (iii) lower stock
3The fact that member firms were allowed to become public companies does not tell us why they
chose to do so. In several cases firms were simply acquired by public companies but in others it was an
important strategic decision. Charles Ellis (2008) in his history of Goldman Sachs—the last major firm
to go public—suggests that the major motive for financial partnerships to become public was to increase
capital for their proprietary trading operations through an IPO. The transition from partnership to public
corporation also had implication for liability of managers. We don’t explicitly address this aspect of the
organizational change.
4Roy Smith, a former partner at Goldman Sachs described the evolution of the relationship between
compensation and firm structure as follows: “In time there was an erosion of the simple principles
of the partnership days. Compensation for top managers followed the trend into excess set by other
public companies. Competition for talent made recruitment and retention more difficult and thus tilted
negotiating power further in favor of stars. You had to pay everyone well because you never knew what
next year would bring, and because there was always someone trying to poach your best trained people,
whom you didn’t want to lose even if they were not superstars. Consequently, bonuses in general became
more automatic and less tied to superior performance. Compensation became the industry’s largest
expense, accounting for about 50% of net revenues”, Wall Street Journal February 7, 2009.
5Since the financial crisis, compensation in the securities industry has increased by 8.7% annually.
Currently nearly half of all revenues are earmarked for compensation and it has been higher in the past.
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Figure 3: Average Market Value of Equity/Book Values of Equity
market evaluation of financial institutions, and (iv) greater income inequality (within
and in relation to other sectors). Existing models capture some of these facts but not
all of them simultaneously. We are also not aware of any study that connects change
in the organizational structure of the financial sector with the increased competition for
managerial talent.6 In this study, instead, we propose a model that generates all of the
above facts as a consequence of the organizational change that has taken place in the
financial sector during the last three decades.
We study a model where investors compete for and hire managers to run investment
projects, with each investor-manager pair representing a financial firm. A key feature
of the model is that production depends on the human capital of the manager which
can be enhanced, within the firm, with costly investment. Human capital accumulation
can be understood as acquiring new skills by engaging in risky financial innovations (e.g.
implementing new financial instruments which may or may not have positive returns).
Since part of the accumulated human capital can be transferred outside the firm by the
manager, there is a conflict of interest between the investor and the manager.
In this environment, the investment desired by the investor may be smaller than the
investment desired by the manager because the cost is incurred by the firm while the
benefits are shared. This implies that, if the investor cannot control the investment policy
either directly or indirectly through a credible compensation scheme, the manager has an
6For example, Cheng, Hong and Scheinkman (2012) and, in a general equilibrium framework, Edmans
and Gabaix (2011) explain how in a Principal-Agent relationship, with a fixed sharing rule, an exogenous
increase in risk can result in higher compensation, since risk-averse financial managers must satisfy their
participation and incentive constraints. Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman (2012) argue that it is “cream
skimming” in the more opaque financial transactions—those taking place in over-the-counter or bespoke
markets—that have encouraged excessive compensation of financial managers and the excessively large
share of GDP of the financial services industry.
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incentive to deviate from the optimal policy simply because she does not internalize the
full cost of the investment. The goal of the paper is to characterize the investment and
compensation policies that result from the (constrained) optimal contract and show how
these policies change when the competition for managers increases and the enforcement
of contracts weakens.
The basic framework that is often used to study executive compensation is adapted
from the principle-agent model of dynamic moral hazard by Spear and Srivastava (1987).7
An assumption typically made in this class of models is that the outside option of the
agent is exogenous. As argued above, however, an important consequence of the demise of
the partnership form is that financial managers are no longer constrained by the limited
liquidity of the portion of their wealth that is tied to the firm and it is easier for them
to seek outside employment. Since the value of seeking outside employment depends
on the market conditions for managers, it becomes important to derive these conditions
endogenously in general equilibrium.
A second assumption typically made in principal-agent models is that investors fully
commit to the contract. However, the clearer separation between investors and managers
that followed the transformation of financial partnerships to public companies and the
associated “competition for managerial talent”, could have also reduced the commitment
of investors. Therefore, in this paper we relax both assumptions: we endogenize the
outside option of managers which will be determined in general equilibrium and we allow
for the limited commitment of investors.8
A main result of this paper is that, whether an increase in competition for managerial
talent results in higher (or lower) risk-taking depends on whether there is double-sided
(or one-sided) limited commitment. When the investor can commit, the constrained-
efficient contract takes into account that in a more competitive environment the risk-
averse manager has a greater incentive to take risks in order to enhance her outside
value, but does so at the expense of the firm.9 Instead, when the investor cannot fully
commit to future compensation, it is in the manager’s interest to choose the investment
level that maximizes her outside value and this increases with competition.
7Among the models in this class see, for example, Wang (1997), Quadrini (2004), Clementi and
Hopenhayn (2006), Fishman and DeMarzo (2007). Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) can also be
considered within this class of models although the frictions are based on limited enforcement rather
than information asymmetry.
8Although in a different set-up, Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini (2004) endogenized the outside value
of entrepreneurs but kept the assumption that investors commit to the long-term contract. Marimon
and Quadrini (2011) relaxed both assumptions and, using a model without uncertainty, showed that
differences in “barriers to competition”, can result in income differences across countries. In these two
papers, however, uncertainty does not play a significant role while it is central to the analysis of the
current paper.
9Notice that, as Cheng et al. (2012) have shown, exogenous higher risk typically results in higher
compensation for managers (see Footnote 6). Consistent with this, we show that when the level of risk
is an endogenous variable, the constrained-efficient contract recommends lower risk. In fact, within the
standard one-sided limited commitment Principal-Agent problem, Edmans and Gabaix (2011) and Bolton
et al. (2012) obtain changes in aggregate risk as a result of the interplay between the principal-agent
problem and an assignment/reallocation problem. We obtain the increase in risk from competition and
weak commitment.
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To make the outside value of managers endogenous and to study the implications
for the whole economy, we embed the micro structure in a general equilibrium model
with two sectors—financial and nonfinancial. With this general framework we study the
consequences of the organizational changes which, as discussed above, had two effects:
it increased competition in the financial sector raising the demand for managers, and
it altered the structure of contractual arrangements between investors and managers in
ways that weakened commitments. These two effects are formalized in the model by a
lower cost to create jobs in the financial sector and by a shift to a regime where investors
do not commit to the contract (double-sided limited commitment). We then show that
these structural changes can generate (i) greater risk-taking; (ii) larger share (and higher
relative productivity) of the financial sector; (iii) lower stock market valuation of financial
institutions; (iv) greater income inequality within and between sectors.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe the environment
and characterize the optimal contract under different assumptions about commitment.
Section 3 embeds the micro structure in a general equilibrium model. Section 4.1 provides
a numerical characterization of the equilibrium and relates its properties to the empirical
facts that motivate the paper. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We start with the description of the financial sector and the contracting relationships
that are at the core of the model. After the characterization of the financial sector, we
will embed it in a general equilibrium in Section 3.
The financial sector is characterized by firms regulated by a contract between an
investor, the owner of the firm, and a manager. We should think of managers as skilled
workers who have the ability to run the firm and implement innovative projects.
Managers are characterized by their human capital ht and are endowed with one unit
of time that can be used in two alternative activities: production and innovation. Denote
by λt the time allocated to innovating in period t. Then the output produced by the firm
in period t+ 1 is equal to
Yt+1 = y(λt)ht, (1)
where the function y(.) satisfies y′ < 0, y′′ > 0, y(1) = 0. Therefore, output increases with
the manager’s human capital, ht, and decreases with the time allocated to innovation, λt
(since the manager allocates less time managing production). The convexity assumption
captures the idea that, as the manager spends less time producing, the ordinary operation
of the firm becomes less efficient. Notice that production activities performed in period
t generate output in period t+ 1. The significance of this assumption will be emphasized
below.
Innovation activities consist of the development of a new implementable project or
idea of size it+1 according to the technology
it+1 = htλtεt+1,
6
where λt is the manager’s time allocated to innovation activities and εt+1 ∈ {0, ε¯} is an
i.i.d. stochastic variable that takes the value of zero with probability 1 − p and 1 with
probability p.
We think of λt as the investment to generate a new implementable project it+1 whose
outcome is uncertain because of the stochastic variable εt+1. A feature of the innovation
technology is that the standard deviation of it+1 is linear in ht and λt. Higher values of
λt are associated with greater uncertainty and, therefore, higher risk.
If implemented, the new project enhances the human capital of the manager according
to ht+1 = ht + it+1. However, for the manager’s human capital to grow, it is essential
that the new project is implemented. This would happen if the manager continues to be
employed in a financial firm. If the new project is not implemented—for instance, if the
manager leaves the financial sector—her human capital remains ht. Therefore, if new
projects are implemented after their development stage, they become embedded human
capital. Otherwise they fully depreciate. The importance of this assumption will become
clear later.10
To use a compact notation, we define g(λt, εt+1) = 1+λtεt+1 the gross growth rate of
human capital, provided the manager remains employed. Then, the evolution of human
capital can be written as
ht+1 = g(λt, εt+1)ht. (2)
Investors are risk-neutral and they are the residual claimants to the output produced
by the firm. Their expected lifetime utility is
V0 = Et
∞∑
t=0
βt(βYt+1 − Ct).
The expected lifetime utility of managers takes the form
Q0 = Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u(Ct)− e(λt)
]
,
where Ct is consumption and e(λt) is the dis-utility from innovation activities. The
period utility satisfies u′ > 0, u′′ < 0 and e′ > 0, e′′ > 0, e(0) = 0 and e(1) =∞.
There are two types of cost associated with financial innovation. The first is the loss
of production as the manager spends more time innovating. The second is the manager’s
dis-utility from innovating. A key difference between these two costs is that the first
is incurred by the firm while the second is incurred by the manager. This creates a
wedge between who pays the cost of the innovation and who enjoys the benefits: If the
manager chooses to quit, the production cost is incurred by the firm but the benefits go
to the manager in the form of increased human capital (provided that the manager finds
10The assumption that newly developed projects depreciate if not implemented while the pre-existing
human capital does not depreciate is not essential for the qualitative properties of the model. It is only
made to maintain the linear homogeneity in ht. This property does not hold if we assume that the whole
human capital depreciates (old and new) when the manager moves away from the financial sector.
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occupation in another financial firm). This asymmetry plays an important role for the
results of the paper.
Managers have the option to quit and search for an offer from a new firm. If they
choose to quit, they will receive an offer with probability ρ ∈ [0, 1]. The probability ρ
captures the degree of competition for managers, that is, the ease with which a manager
finds occupation in the financial sector after quitting the firm. Higher values of ρ denote a
more competitive financial sector. Since we are assuming that an implementable project
of size it+1 fully depreciates if not implemented in a firm, the human capital of a manager
who chooses to quit at the beginning of period t+ 1 will be ht + it+1 only if she receives
an offer. Otherwise, the human capital remains ht.
Denote by Q
t+1
(ht) the outside value at the beginning of period t + 1 without an
external offer and by Qt+1(ht+1) the outside value with an offer. The expected outside
value at t+ 1 of a manager with previous human capital ht is equal to
D(ht, ht+1, ρ) = (1− ρ) ·Qt+1(ht) + ρ ·Qt+1(ht+1), (3)
where ht+1 = ht(1 + λtεt+1)
For the moment we take ρ, Q
t+1
(ht) and Qt+1(ht+1) as given. At this stage we only
assume that Q
t+1
(ht) and Qt+1(ht+1) are strictly increasing and differentiable, which
implies D2,3 > 0. However, when we extend the model to a general equilibrium in
Section 3, the probability of an external offer and the outside values with and without
an offer will be derived endogenously. This is an important innovation of our model and
will be central for some of the results.
In addition to having the ability to quit, the manager has full control over the choice
of λt. Full control is allowed by the assumption that λt is directly observable only by
the manager. The investor can only infer the actual value of λt in the next period after
the realization of output Yt+1. This implies that, in absence of proper incentives, the
λt chosen by the manager may not maximize the surplus of the partnership. Therefore,
there are two sources of frictions on the side of the manager: the ability to quit and the
discretion to choose any value of λt.
Definition 1 A contract between an investor and a manager with initial human capital
h0 consists of sequences of payments to the manager {C(Ht,Λt)}∞t=0 and investments
{λ(Ht,Λt)}∞t=0, conditional on the observed history of human capital Ht = (h0, . . . , ht)
and investment Λt ≡ (λ0, . . . , λt−1).
Notice that the payment made to the manager in period t is not conditional on the
innovation λt chosen by the manager in period t. This is because λt becomes public
information (by observing production) only in the next period.
2.1 The optimal contract with one-sided limited commitment
We first characterize the optimal contract when the investor commits but the manager
does not (one-sided limited commitment). In this environment the manager could quit
the firm at any point in time and could choose any investment λt. The optimal contract
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can be characterized by solving a planner’s problem that maximizes the weighted sum
of utilities for the investor and the manager but subject to a set of constraints. These
constraints guarantee that the allocation chosen by the planner is enforceable in the sense
that both parties choose to participate and the manager has no incentive to take actions
other than those prescribed by the contract. We first characterize the key constraints
and then we specify the optimization problem.
The allocation chosen by the planner must be such that the value of the contract for
the manager is not smaller than the value of quitting. This gives rise to the enforcement
constraint
Et+1
∞∑
n=0
βn
[
u(Ct+1+n)− e(λt+1+n)
]
≥ D(ht, ht+1, ρ), t ≥ 0. (4)
A second constraint takes into account that the manager has full control of the in-
vestment λt. The manager could deviate from the λt recommended by the planner since,
through the choice of λt, she can affect the outside value. Thus, the allocation must
satisfy an incentive-compatibility constraint insuring that the manager does not deviate
from the recommended investment policy.
Denote by λˆt the investment chosen by the manager when she deviates from the
recommended λt. This maximizes the outside value net of the cost of effort, that is,
λˆt = arg max
λ∈[0,1]
{
− e(λ) + βEtD
(
ht, g(λ, εt+1)ht, ρ
)}
. (5)
Since the outside value of the manager is differentiable, the optimal deviation solves
the first-order condition
eλ(λˆt) ≥ βEtD2
(
ht, g(λˆ, εt+1)ht, ρ
)
gλ(λˆ, εt+1)ht, (6)
which is satisfied with equality if λˆt > 0.
We can now see the importance of the assumption that the manager faces the effort
dis-utility from innovating. In absence of this, the optimal deviation λˆt would be 1.
Instead, with eλ(1) = ∞, the optimal deviation is interior in the interval [0, 1] and is
affected by a change in the outside value.
Given the optimal deviation λˆt, the incentive-compatibility constraint at t is
−e(λt)+βEt
∞∑
n=0
βn
(
u(Ct+n+1)−e(λt+n+1)
)
≥ −e(λˆt)+βEtD
(
ht, g(λˆt, htεt+1), ρ
)
. (7)
Notice that Ct does not appear in (7) because current consumption cannot be con-
tingent on current investment, λt, because the investment becomes public information in
the next period. This limits the ability of the planner to punish the manager by cutting
consumption in the current period. The manager can be punished in the next period,
once the investment becomes public information. At this stage, however, the manager
has the option of quitting which imposes a lower bound on the possible punishment.
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We now have all the ingredients to write down the optimization problem solved by
the planner in a regime with one-sided limited commitment. Let µ˜0 be the planner’s
weight assigned to the manager and normalize to 1 the weight assigned to the investor.
We can then write the planner’s problem as
max
{Ct,λt}∞t=0
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt
(
βy(λt)ht − Ct
)
+ µ˜0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(Ct)
}
(8)
s.t. (2), (4), (7).
The problem is also subject to initial participation constraints for both the investor
and the manager which, for simplicity, we have omitted. They only restrict the admissible
values for the weight µ˜0.
Following Marcet and Marimon (2011), the problem can be written recursively as
W˜ (h, µ˜) = min
χ˜,γ˜(ε′)
max
C,λ
{
βy(λ)h− C + µ˜
(
u(C)− e(λ)
)
− χ˜
(
e(λ)− e(λˆ)
)
+
βE
[
W˜ (h′, µ˜′)− χ˜D
(
h, g(λˆ, ε′)h, ρ
)
− γ˜(ε′)D(h, h′, ρ)
]}
(9)
s.t. h′ = g(λ, ε′)h, µ˜′ = µ˜+ χ˜+ γ˜(ε′),
where γ˜(ε′) is the Lagrange multiplier for the enforcement constraint (4) and χ˜ is the
Lagrange multiplier for the incentive-compatibility constraint (7).
The function W˜ (h, µ˜) is related to the value of the contract for the investor, V˜ (h, µ˜),
and to the value for the manager, Q˜(h, µ˜), by the equation W˜ (h, µ˜) = V˜ (h, µ˜)+ µ˜Q˜(h, µ˜).
An environment with full commitment is just a special case with γ˜(ε′) = χ˜ = 0. Another
special case is when λt is controlled by the investor, in which case we impose χ˜ = 0.
Differentiating problem (9) with respect to C we obtain the optimality condition
Ct = u
−1
c
(
1
µ˜t
)
, (10)
which characterizes the consumption policy as a function of the state variable µ˜t. This
variable evolves according to the law of motion µ˜t+1 = µ˜t + χ˜t + γ˜t(εt+1).
It is useful to consider the normalized manager’s weight, or manager’s share of the
surplus, µt = µ˜t/ht. Since, income is proportional to ht (recall (1)), the manager’s share
plays a key role in our analysis. The normalized value functions take the form W (h, µ) ≡
W˜ (h, hµ)/h = V (h, µ) + µQ(h, µ), where Q(h, µ) ≡ Q˜(h, hµ) and V (h, µ) ≡ V˜ (h, hµ)/h.
Furthermore, since the technology and the preferences of the investor are linear in h,
we have that V (h, µ) = v(µ). therefore, W (h, µ) = v(µ) + µQ(h, µ). Similarly, we can
normalize the multipliers—χt = χ˜t/ht and γt(εt+1) = γ˜t(εt+1)/ht—to obtain the law of
motion of the manager’s share µt+1 = (µt + χt + γt(εt+1)) /g(λt, εt+1).
10
If contracts were perfectly enforceable, χt and γt(εt+1) would be both equal to zero,
but then if λt > 0, Eµt+1 < µt, since Eht+1 = (1+pλt)ht. Given that optimal investments
satisfy λt > 0, the normalized share of the surplus µt converges to zero (i.e. it is a lower-
bounded submartingale). However, with one-sided limited commitment, the enforcement
and incentive-compatibility constraints set a lower bound on µt. Thus, with one-sided
limited commitment the manager has a minimum share guaranteed. A downside of this
is that the contract does not provide full insurance since the manager’s consumption
increases stochastically.
The investment policy is characterized by the first-order condition with respect to
λ. Using g(λt, εt+1) = 1 + λtεt+1 and the above normalization, the optimality condition
can be written as
(µt + χt) eλ(λt)− βyλ(λt) ≥ βEt
[(
v (µt+1) +
(µt + χt + γt(εt+1))Qh(ht+1, µt+1)− γt(εt+1)D2 (ht, ht+1, ρ)
)
εt+1
]
, (11)
which is satisfied with equality when λt > 0. See Appendix B for more details.
The left-hand side of (11) is the marginal (direct) cost of investment per unit of
human capital, which is increasing in λt, µt and χt. The right-hand-side is the expected
marginal benefit from investing, net of participation costs. With full commitment the
marginal (direct) cost decreases, since χt = 0, and µt converges to zero. Notice that,
with full commitment, there are no inter-temporal participation costs (i.e. γ(εt+1) = 0).
Furthermore, Qh(ht+1, µt+1) = 0, since the manager’s consumption is constant (only
depends on µ˜0) and the investment effort is independent of h. Therefore, only v(µt+1)
matters and, given that v′(µ) < 0, the right-hand side of (11) increases. In sum, λ∗t is
increasing.
With one-sided limited commitment, a binding enforcement constraint is an
additional cost to investment: the cost of having to compensate the manager to keep
her in the firm, whenever γ(εt+1) > 0. This lowers the increase in the right-hand side of
(11). Furthermore, in relation to the left-hand side of (11), limited enforcement and/or
incentive compatibility constraints raise a manager’s marginal effort-cost when they are
binding and prevent µ from converging to zero. In sum, given (h, µ), the investment policy
with one-sided limited commitment is less risky when the enforcement and incentive
constraints are binding.
We are particularly interested in the effect of increasing competition (higher ρ) on the
optimal investment policy. In an economy with higher ρ managers have better outside
opportunities implying that the initial µ0 is higher, for a given h0. This redistribution
affects investment. For instance, with full commitment, it affects the λ∗0: it increases
the right-hand side of (11) and lowers v(µ0). Therefore, a contract that starts in a higher
ρ economy it is characterized by a higher µ0 and a lower expected risk profile. But, once
the investor and the manager are committed to the contract increasing competition has
no effect on investment.
With one-sided limited commitment an economy with a relative high ρ is also
characterised by a higher µ0 and a lower expected risk profile. However, increasing
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competition after the contract starts has an effect on investment. There is a direct
effect on the participation cost when the enforcement constraint is (or becomes) binding,
throughD2,3 in the right and-hand side of (11) and an indirect effect through the increases
in the multipliers of the enforcement and incentive constraints, γ(ε′) and χ. In sum, we
obtain the following result (formally proved in Appendix B).
Proposition 1 Suppose that, at (h, µ), the optimal investment is interior, that is λ∗ ∈
(0, 1). If Qh,µ(h
′, µ′) ≤ 0 then more competition for managers (higher ρ) results in a
lower optimal investment λ∗ when the enforcement constraint is, or becomes, binding.
As we discuss in Appendix B, the assumption Qh,µ(h
′, µ′) ≤ 0 is fairly general and,
in particular, it is satisfied if the manager has CRRA preferences for consumption with
an intertemporal elasticity of substitution less than or equal to one. In Subsection
2.3 we present in more detail the log case of unitary elasticity of substitution, where
Qh,µ(h
′, µ′) = 0, which is then used in the rest of the paper.
2.2 The optimal contract with double-sided limited commitment
The law of motion µ˜t+1 = µ˜t+ χ˜t+ γ˜t(εt+1) captures the investor’s commitment to fulfill
promises made to the manager. With double-sided limited commitment the investor does
not commit to fulfill his promises and renegotiates whenever the value of the contract for
the manager exceeds the outside value. This implies that the value of µ˜t chosen in the
previous period becomes irrelevant for the new µ˜t+1 chosen in the current period. Under
these conditions, the manager has the incentive to choose the investment that maximizes
the outside value as defined in (5), that is, λt = λˆt. Thus, the incentive-compatibility
constraint and the multiplier χ˜t become irrelevant, and the optimal contract solves
W (h, µ˜) = min
γ˜(ε′)
max
C
{
βy(λˆ)h− C + µ˜
(
u(C)− e(λˆ)
)
+
βE
[
W
(
g(λˆ, ε′)h, µ˜′
)
− γ˜(ε′)D
(
h, g(λˆ, ε′)h, ρ
)]}
(12)
s.t. µ˜′ = γ˜(ε′).
The contract with double-sided limited commitment simply prescribes a consumption
plan which is determined by (10) with µ˜′ = γ˜(ε′), and the investment is λˆ, which is the
solution to (6). Since D2,3 > 0, an increase in competition captured by the parameter ρ
increases the right-hand-side of (6), that is, it increases the marginal benefit of investing
more for the manager. This is stated formally in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 Consider the environment with double-sided limited commitment and
suppose that λˆ ∈ (0, 1). Then a higher ρ results in a higher investment λˆ.
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Propositions 1 and 2 show that the impact of higher competition on risk-taking de-
pends crucially on whether both agents can commit to the contract. We should expect
increasing competition to result in increased risk-taking only when there is limited com-
mitment from both investors and managers.
2.3 The normalized contract
Since human capital grows on average over time, so does the value of the contract for both
the manager and the investor. It is convenient to normalize the growing variables so that
we can work with stationary variables. The normalization will be especially convenient
in Section 3 when we embed the financial sector in a general equilibrium. This will be
facilitated by specifying the utility of managers in log-form and by assuming that the
outside values of managers—which at this stage are exogenous—take special functional
forms.
Assumption 1 The utility function and the outside values of managers take the forms
u(C)− e(λ) = ln(C) + α ln(1− λ),
Q
t+1
(ht) = q + B ln(ht),
Qt+1(ht+1) = q + B ln(ht+1),
where q, q and B ≡ 11−β are constant.
Although the functional forms for the outside values may seem arbitrary at this stage,
we will see that in the extension to the general equilibrium they take these forms. Also
notice that Assumption 1 guarantees that these functions are differentiable and strictly
increasing as we assumed earlier, which in turn implies D2,3 > 0.
We are now ready to normalize all growing variables. The value of the contract for
the investor can be expressed recursively as Vt = βy(λt)ht − Ct + βEtVt+1 and can be
normalized to
vt = βy(λt)− ct + βEtg(λt, εt+1)vt+1, (13)
where vt = Vt/ht and ct = Ct/ht.
The value of the contract for a manager can be expressed recursively as Qt = ln(Ct)+
α ln(1 − λt) + βEtQt+1. If we subtract B ln(ht) on both sides and add and subtract
βBEt ln(ht+1) on the right hand side, we obtain
Qt − B ln(ht) = ln(ct) + α ln(1− λt) + βBEt ln
(
ht+1
ht
)
+ βEt
[
Qt+1 − B ln(ht+1)
]
.
Defining qt = Qt − B ln(ht), we can rewrite the above expression more compactly as
qt = ln(ct) + α ln(1− λt) + βEt
[
B ln
(
g(λt, εt+1)
)
+ qt+1
]
. (14)
This provides the normalized value of the manager in recursive form.
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The enforcement constraint for the manager after the realization εt+1 is
Qt+1(ht+1) ≥ (1− ρ) ·Qt+1(ht) + ρ ·Qt+1(ht+1).
Using qt+1 = Qt+1(ht+1)−B ln(ht+1) and the functional forms specified in Assumption
1, the enforcement constraint (7) can be written as
qt+1 ≥ (1− ρ)q + ρq¯ − (1− ρ)B ln
(
g(λt, εt+1)
)
. (15)
The right-hand-side depends on λt (provided that ρ < 1). Thus, investment affects
the outside value of the manager and, when the enforcement constraint is binding, it
affects compensation. This property is a direct consequence of the assumption that the
outside value of the manager without an external offer depends on ht, while the outside
value with an external offer depends on ht+1. If both values were dependent on the
embedded human capital ht+1, the term (1 − ρ)B ln(g(λt, εt+1)) would disappear. The
value of quitting would still depend on ρ but it would not affect the optimal λt.
The constraint that insures that the manager chooses the optimal investment is
α ln(1− λt) + βEtQt+1
(
g(λt, εt+1)ht
)
≥
α ln(1− λˆt) + βEt
[
(1− ρ) ·Q
t+1
(ht) + ρ ·Qt+1
(
g(λˆt, εt+1)ht
)]
,
where λt is the investment recommended by the optimal contract and λˆt is the invest-
ment chosen by the manager (the deviation). Normalizing, we can rewrite the incentive-
compatibility constraint as
α ln(1− λt) + βEt
[
qt+1 + B ln
(
g(λt, εt+1)
)]
≥
α ln(1− λˆt) + βEt
[
(1− ρ)q + ρq¯ + ρB ln
(
g(λˆt, εt+1)
)]
. (16)
We can now provide a more explicit characterization of the manager’s optimal in-
vestment deviation λˆt. This maximizes the expected value of quitting net of the effort
cost, that is, the right-hand-side of (16). Using g(λ, ε) = 1 + λε and remembering that
ε ∈ {0, 1} with probabilities 1− p and p, the optimality condition (6) can be written as
α
1− λˆt
≥ ρβBp
1 + λˆt
, (17)
which is satisfied with equality if λˆt > 0. As implied by Proposition 2, we can now see
more explicitly that λˆ is increasing in the probability ρ. Therefore, when the manager
faces better outside options, the strategic incentive to innovate increases.
The original contractual problem (8) with one-sided limited commitment can be re-
formulated in normalized form using the ‘promised utility’ approach. This maximizes
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the normalized investor’s value subject to the normalized promise-keeping, limited en-
forcement and incentive-compatibility constraints, that is,
v(q) = max
λ,c,q(ε′)
{
βy(λ)− c+ βEg(λ, ε′)v
(
q(ε′)
)}
(18)
subject to (14), (15), (16).
The solution provides the investment policy λ = ϕλ(q), the consumption policy c =
ϕc(q), and the continuation utilities q(ε) = ϕq(q, ε). Because of the normalization, these
policies are independent of h. However, once we know h, we can reconstruct the original,
non-normalized values, that is, C = ch and Q = q + B ln(h). Also, once we know
the investment policy λ and the realization of the shock ε′, we can determine the next
period human capital as (1 + λε′)h and construct the whole sequence of human capital.
Therefore, to characterize the optimal contract we can focus on the normalized policies.
The optimal policies ϕλ(q), ϕc(q), and ϕq(q, ε) satisfy the first order conditions
c = µ, (19)
α(µ+ χ)
1− λ − βyλ(λ) = βp
[
v
(
q(ε¯)
)
+
B[µ+ χ+ (1− ρ)γ(ε¯)]
1 + λ
]
, (20)
µ(ε) =
µ+ χ+ γ(ε)
1 + λε
. (21)
These conditions are derived in Appendix C. The variables µ, γ(ε) and χ are the
Lagrange multipliers for constraints (14)-(16). The envelope condition v′(q) = −µ (also
derived in Appendix C) shows the equivalence between the normalized problem (18) and
the original problem (8).
For the case with double-sided limited commitment, we can reformulate problem
(12) in normalized form in a similar fashion. Using the ‘promised utility’ approach, the
partnership contract with double-sided limited commitment can be written as
v(q) = max
c,q(ε)
{
βy(λˆ)− c+ βEg(λˆ, ε)v
(
q(ε)
)}
(22)
subject to
q = ln(c) + α ln(1− λˆ) + βE
[
B ln
(
g(λˆ, ε)
)
+ q(ε)
]
q(ε) = (1− ρ)q + ρq¯ − (1− ρ)B ln
(
g(λˆ, ε)
)
, for all ε,
where λˆ is determined by condition (17).
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In this case, the optimal deviation λˆ is independent of q. As a result, λˆ determines a
lower bound on the normalized utility, denoted by qmin, which satisfies the condition
qmin = ln
(
c(qmin)
)
+ α ln(1− λˆ) + βEt
[
(1− ρ)q + ρq¯ + ρB ln
(
g(λˆ, ε)
)]
. (23)
Problem (22) can be seen as a special case of problem (18) where we have replaced
the incentive-compatibility constraint (16) with λ = λˆ. Furthermore, we have imposed
that the enforcement constraint (15) is always satisfied with equality. This is because
any promise that exceeds the outside value of the manager will be renegotiated ex-post.
Notice that in this problem the decision variables, c and q(ε), are fully determined by
the promise-keeping and incentive-compatibility constraints. Therefore, the problem can
be solved without performing any optimization, besides solving for λˆ.
2.4 Contract properties
In this subsection we illustrate the properties of the optimal contract numerically. The
specific parameter values will be described in Section 4.1 where we conduct a quantitative
analysis with the general model. The computational procedure used to solve the optimal
contract is described in Appendix E11.
As we have seen, the solution to the contractual problem (18) with one-sided limited
commitment provides the optimal policies for investment, λ = ϕλ(q), manager’s consump-
tion, c = ϕc(q), and continuation utilities, q(ε) = ϕq(q, ε). Because of the normalization,
these policies are independent of h. However, once we know the normalized policies and
the initial human capital h0, we can construct the whole sequence of h as well as the
non-normalized values of consumption, C = ch, and lifetime utility, Q = q + B ln(h).
Therefore, to characterize the optimal contract we can focus on the normalized policies
as characterized by the first order conditions (19)-(21). This is also the case for the
solution to problem (22) in the environment with double-sided limited commitment.
The dynamics of promised utilities. The top panels of Figure 4 plot the values
of next period normalized continuation utilities, q(ε) = ϕq(q, ε), as functions of current
normalized utility, q, for the environments with one-sided and double-sided limited com-
mitment. We have also plotted the 45 degree line which allows us to see more clearly the
dynamics of the contract in response to the shock (if the continuation utility is below
(above) the 45 degree line then the next period q is smaller (bigger) than the current
q). Finally, the vertical lines indicate the initial normalized values of the contract for the
manager, q0. At this stage we have not specified yet as the initial values are determined
in the two environments. These will be described in later when we embed the model in
a general equilibrium. For the moment we take them as exogenous.
We discuss first the case with one-sided limited commitment. The contract starts
with an initial q¯ indicated by the vertical line. Then, if the investment does not succeed
(ε = 0), the next period value of q remains the same. If the investment succeeds (ε = 1),
11Without loss of generality, we assume for the rest of the paper that ε¯ = 1.
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Figure 4: Continuation utilities and investment with one-sided and double-sided limited
commitment.
the next period q declines until it reaches a lower bound. It is important to remember,
however, that these are normalized utilities. Therefore, the fact that q declines does not
necessarily mean that the actual (non-normalized) utility Q = q + B ln(h) declines. For
example, it could be possible that Q increases but less than B ln(h).
The dynamics of promised utilities can be explained as follows. For relatively high
values of q, the limited commitment constraint is not binding and the manager’s value
evolves as if the contract was fully enforceable. In this case it becomes optimal to provide
full insurance to the manager, that is, to keep the non-normalized utility Q constant. In
terms of normalized utility this means that q = Q − B ln(h) remains constant when the
investment fails (ε = 0) since in this case h does not change. When the investment
succeeds (ε = 1), however, h increases. Then q = Q − B ln(h) must fall in order to
keep the non-normalized utility Q constant. However, as q declines, the enforcement
constraint becomes binding. In fact, a declining q means that the non-normalized utility
Q stays constant but the outside value increases with h. Eventually, the normalized
utility reaches a lower bound which is indicated by the intersection of the dashed line
q(1) with the 45 degree line. After that the continuation utilities oscillate between two
points corresponding to the intersections of the two dashed lines with the 45 degree lines.
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To summarize, the contract starts with an initial normalized utility q0 indicated by
the vertical line. Then, if the realization of the shock is low, q does not change. If the
realization of the shock is high, q declines until it reaches a lower bound. At this point
the normalized continuation utility fluctuates between two values indicated in the graph
by the intersection of the dashed lines with the 45 degree line.
The optimal policy in the environment with double-sided limited commitment is
shown in the second panel of Figure 4. In this environment the investor does not com-
mit to the contract and renegotiates any promises that exceed the outside value of the
manager. As a result, the manager always receives the outside value. The only exception
is in the first period when the manager receives the value indicated in the figure by the
vertical line. After the initial period, q jumps immediately to the outside option and
fluctuates between two values. The fact that the initial q (indicated by the vertical line)
is bigger than future values implies that in the first period the manager receives a higher
payment (consumption) relative to her human capital.
Investment. The bottom panels of Figure 4 plot the investment policy λ. In the envi-
ronment with one-sided limited commitment, the enforcement constraint is not binding
for high values of q. As a result, λ is only determined by the investment cost, part of
which is given by the effort dis-utility. For lower values of q, however, the enforcement
constraint for the manager is either binding or close to be binding. Consequently, a
higher value of λ increases the outside value for the manager and must be associated
with a higher promised utility. Since this is costly for the investor, the optimal λ is lower
for low values of q (although quantitatively the dependence is small).
In the environment with double-sided limited commitment λ is independent of q since
the manager always chooses λ = λˆ. Given the limited commitment of the investor, the
manager knows that the value of the contract will always be reneged to her outside
value. Thus, the objective of the manager is to choose the investment that maximizes
the outside value net of the utility cost of effort. But in doing so, the manager does not
take into account that investment also reduces production.
For the particular parametrization considered here, the investment chosen with double-
sided limited commitment is greater than in the environment with one-sided limited com-
mitment. However, this property is not general because there are two contrasting effects.
On the one-hand, with double-sided limited commitment, the manager does not take
into account the loss of production when choosing the investment that maximizes the
outside option. This leads to a higher choice of λ. On the other, the outside option is
the value of finding employment in another firm, which happens with probability ρ < 1.
Instead, when λ is chosen to maximize the surplus of the existing contract—which is the
case in the one-sided limited commitment—the innovation adds value with probability
1. This leads to a lower choice of λ. Therefore, to have that the the investment in the
double-sided limited commitment is bigger than the investment with one-sided limited
commitment, we need that the marginal production loss from innovation (the deriva-
tive of y(λ)) and the probability of finding another occupation (the probability ρ) are
sufficiently large.
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3 General model
We now embed the financial sector in a general equilibrium framework. This allows us
to endogenize the parameter ρ and the outside values Q
t+1
(ht) and Qt+1(ht+1).
There are two sectors in the model—financial and nonfinancial—and two types of
agents—a unit mass of investors, a unit mass of workers. Innovations as described earlier
take place only in the financial sector. This does not mean that there are no innovations
outside of the financial sector. Instead, we should interpret them as ‘differential’ innova-
tions compared to the rest of economy which, for simplicity, we do not model explicitly.
An alternative interpretation of the model is that the financial sector encompasses all
the ‘innovative segments’ of the economy, financial and nonfinancial, where similar or-
ganizational changes have taken place. In this paper we prefer to focus on the financial
sector because the organizational and economic changes described in the introduction
have been more evident.
Investors are the owners of firms and are risk neutral. The risk neutrality can be
rationalized by the ability of investors to diversify their ownership of firms. Workers
have the same utility ln(ct) + α ln(1− λt). We assume that only managerial occupations
in the financial sector require effort λt and, therefore, the utility of workers employed in
the nonfinancial sector reduces to ln(ct). We interpret λt as the differential innovation
effort compared to the rest of the economy.
All agents discount future utility by the factor βˆ and survive with probability 1− ω.
In every period there are newborn agents of each type so that the population size and
composition remain constant over time. Newborn workers are endowed with initial human
capital h0. The motivation for adding this particular demographic structure is to prevent
the distribution of ht from becoming degenerate. The assumption of a constant initial
human capital h0 together with the finite lives of workers guarantee that the distribution
of ht across financial managers converges to an invariant distribution and the model is
stationary in levels.
Taking into account the survival probability, the ‘effective’ discount factor is β =
βˆ(1 − ω). Using the effective discount factor β, the previous characterization of the
optimal contract between managers and investors applies to the general model without
modification.
A fraction ψ of workers are born with the ability or skills to become managers in the
financial sector. We denote by S the total mass of workers employed in the nonfinancial
sector (with and without the ability to become financial managers) and 1 − S is the
mass of workers employed in the financial sector. The assumption that only a fraction
ψ of workers have the ability to become financial managers is only important for the
quantitative properties of the model, it does not affect its qualitative properties.
The nonfinancial sector is competitive and produces output with the technology
F (H) = zH, where z is a constant and H is the aggregate efficiency-units of labor
supplied by workers employed in the nonfinancial sector. This results from the aggre-
gation of human capital of all workers employed in the nonfinancial sector. As we will
see, in equilibrium, the human capital of each worker employed in the nonfinancial sec-
tor is h0. Therefore, H = h0S. For simplicity, we abstract from capital accumulation.
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Because of the competitiveness, the wage rate (per unit of human capital) earned in the
nonfinancial sector is equal to the marginal productivity, which is equal to z.
While the nonfinancial sector is competitive, the hiring process in the financial sector
is characterized by matching frictions. Workers with the ability to become financial
managers, find occupation in the financial sector if matched with vacancies funded by
investors. Denote by ρt+1 the matching probability. Then the lifetime utility of a worker
currently employed in the nonfinancial sector with human capital h and with the ability
to become a financial manager is
Q
t
(h) = ln(h) + β
[
(1− ρt+1) ·Qt+1(h) + ρt+1 ·Qt+1(h)
]
. (24)
The worker consumes the wage income h in the current period. In the next period,
with probability ρt+1 she finds a job in the financial sector. In this case the lifetime
utility is Qt+1(h). With probability 1 − ρt+1 she remains employed in the nonfinancial
sector and the lifetime utility is Q
t+1
(h). In this extended model, the value for a skilled
worker (manager) of not finding an occupation in the financial sector is the value of being
employed in the nonfinancial sector. The function Qt+1(h) is the value of a new contract
for the worker.
3.1 Matching and general equilibrium
In the financial sector, investors post vacancies that specify the level of human capital h
and the value of the contract for the manager Qt(h). This is the value of the long-term
contract signed between the firm and the manager. The cost of posting a vacancy is τh.
Let Xt(h,Qt) be the number of vacancies posted for managers with human capi-
tal h that offer Qt(h). Furthermore, denote by Ut(h,Qt) the number of workers with
human capital h in search of an occupation in the financial sector with posted value
Qt(h). The number of matches is determined by the matching function mt(h,Qt) =
AXt(h,Qt)
ηUt(h,Qt)
1−η. The probabilities that a vacancy is filled and a worker finds
occupation are φt(h,Qt) = mt(h,Qt)/Xt(h,Qt) and ρt(h,Qt) = mt(h,Qt)/Ut(h,Qt).
Investors can freely post vacancies, giving rise in equilibrium to the free-entry condi-
tion φt(h,Qt)Vt(h,Qt) = τh. The free entry condition must be satisfied for any level of
human capital h.
We can now take advantage of the properties of the optimal contract characterized in
the previous sections where we have shown that the value of the contract for the investor
is linear in h, that is, Vt(h,Qt) = vt(q¯t)h. The variable q¯t is the normalized value of
the contract for a newly hired worker. To determine q¯t we need only to define a menu
of posted contracts for all possible levels of human capital h. More precisely, once qt
is decided, the investor offers Qt = qt + B ln(h) to the worker with human capital h.
Then, focusing on a symmetric equilibrium in which the probability of filling a vacancy
is independent of h, the free-entry condition can be rewritten in normalized form as
φt(q¯t) vt(q¯t) = τ. (25)
Appendix D discusses the equilibrium conditions in more detail and shows that the
worker receives a fraction 1− η of the matching surplus. This is the standard efficiency
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property of models with directed search. As is well known, the same outcome would arise
if we assume Nash bargaining with the bargaining power of managers equal to 1− η (the
Hosios (1990) condition).
Next we normalize the employment value of workers employed in the nonfinancial
sector, equation (24). This can be rewritten as
q
t
= ln(1) + β
[
(1− ρt+1) · qt+1 + ρt+1 · qt+1
]
. (26)
The values q
t
and q¯t correspond to the normalized outside values used in the previous
characterization of the optimal contract. The only difference is that in a general equilib-
rium these values could be time dependent. We now have all the ingredients to define a
steady state general equilibrium where these values are constant.
Definition 2 (Steady state) Given a contractual regime (one-sided or double-sided
limited commitment), a stationary equilibrium is defined by
1. Policies λ = ϕλ(q), c = ϕc(q), q(ε) = ϕq(q, ε) for contracts in the financial sector;
2. Normalized utilities for workers employed in the nonfinancial sector, q, workers
newly hired in the financial sector, q¯, and initial normalized value for investors, v¯;
3. Number of workers in the nonfinancial sector, S, of which U have managerial skills.
Posted vacancies, X, filling probability, φ, and finding probability, ρ;
4. Distribution of workers employed in the financial sector M(h, q);
5. Law of motion for the distribution of financial workers, Mt+1 = Φ(Mt);
Such that
1. The policy rules ϕλ(q), ϕc(q), ϕq(q, ε) solve the optimal contract;
2. The normalized utilities q and q¯ and investor value v¯ solve (25), (26) and (37);
3. Filling and finding probabilities satisfy φ = m(X,U)/X and ρ = m(X,U)/U .
4. The law of motion Φ(M) is consistent with contract policies ϕλ(q) and ϕq(q, ε).
5. The distribution of managers is constant, that is, M = Φ(M).
For the later analysis, it will be convenient to state formally the property for which
increasing competition for managers redistributes rents in their favor. The proof is pro-
vided in Appendix D.
Lemma 3 An increase in ρ results in a higher steady-state contract value q offered to
the manager; i.e. q′(ρ) > 0.
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3.2 Inequality
The general model features two types of occupations: workers employed in the nonfinan-
cial sector (some of whom have the ability to become managers of financial firms) and
skilled workers employed in the financial sector. This permits us to study the inequal-
ity of the incomes earned across the two sectors and the inequality within the financial
sector. Here we focus on the distribution within the financial sector.
Since the income of workers employed in the financial sector is proportional to human
capital, we can use h as a proxy for the distribution of income. As a specific index of
inequality we use the square of the coefficient of variation in human capital, that is,
Inequality index ≡ Var(h)
Ave(h)2
.
In a steady state equilibrium with double-sided limited commitment, the inequality
index can be calculated exactly. Let’s first derive the steady state employment in the
financial sector, 1 − S. This can be derived from the flow of workers with managerial
ability into financial occupations (at rate ρ) and out of financial occupations (at rate ω),
that is, 1− St+1 = (1− St)(1− ω) + U(1− ω)ρt+1. The equivalent equation for workers
with managerial ability is Ut+1 = Ut(1 − ω)(1 − ρ) + ωψ. After imposing steady state
conditions, these two equations can be solved for the stock of workers employed in the
financial sector,
1− S = ρ(1− ω)ψ
ρ+ ω − ρω .
Next we compute the average human capital for the mass 1− S of workers employed
in the financial sector,
Ave(h) = ω
∞∑
j=0
(1− ω)jEjhj .
The index j denotes the employment tenure for active managers (employment pe-
riods). Therefore, j = 0 identifies newly hired workers. Since managers survive with
probability 1−ω, the fraction of managers who have been active for j periods is ω(1−ω)j .
The variance of h across the 1− S workers is calculated as
Var(h) = ω
∞∑
j=0
(1− ω)jEj
(
hj −Ave(h)
)2
,
which has a similar interpretation as the formula used to compute the average h.
Using the property of the model with double-sided limited commitment where all firms
choose the same λ and, therefore, all managers experience the same expected growth in
human capital, Appendix F shows that the average human capital and the inequality
index take the forms
Ave(h) = h0
[
ω
1− (1− ω)Eg(λˆ, ε)
]
, (27)
Inequality index =
[1− (1− ω)Eg(λˆ, ε)]2
ω[1− (1− ω)Eg(λˆ, ε)2] − 1. (28)
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The average human capital and the inequality index are simple functions of the in-
vestment λˆ. We then have the following proposition.
Lemma 4 The average human capital and the inequality index for financial managers
are strictly increasing in λˆ.
That average human capital increases with investment is obvious. The dependence
of inequality on λˆ can be explained as follows. If λˆ = 0, the human capital of all
managers will be equal to h0 and the inequality index is zero. As λˆ becomes positive,
inequality increases for two reasons. First, since the growth rate g(λˆ, ε) is stochastic,
human capital will differ within the same tenure cohort of managers (managers with the
same employment tenure). Second, since each cohort experiences growth, the average
human capital differs between cohorts of managers. More importantly, the cross sectional
dispersion in human capital induced by these two mechanisms (the numerator of the
inequality index) dominates the increase in average human capital (the denominator of
the inequality index). Thus, inequality increases in λˆ.
We can compute explicitly the within and between cohort inequality by decomposing
the variance of h as follows:
Var(h) = ω
∞∑
j=0
(1− ω)jEj
(
hj −Avej(h)
)2
+ ω
∞∑
j=0
(1− ω)j
(
h¯j −Ave(h)
)2
,
where Avej(h) is the average human capital for the j cohort (managers employed for
j periods). The first term sums the variances of each cohort while the second term
sums the squared deviation of each cohort from the overall average. Using the above
decomposition, the appendix shows that the within and between cohort inequality indices
have simple analytical expressions and they are both strictly increasing in λˆ.
4 The impact of organizational changes
We now explore the core issue addressed in this paper, that is, how the organizational
change described in the introduction affects risk taking, sectoral income, valuation of
financial firms and inequality. We have identified two key effects from the organizational
change in the financial sector:
1. Increased competition for managers: The separation between investors and
managers expanded the base of potential investors who could fund new investment
projects, facilitating the creation of new businesses. In the context of our model
this is captured, parsimoniously, by a reduction in the vacancy cost τ . A lower value
of τ generates the creation of more vacancies and, therefore, more competition for
managers.
2. Weakened the commitment of investors: While the limited commitment of
managers was also a feature of the traditional partnership (managers were not
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prevented from leaving the partnership), the commitment of investors was much
stronger since there was not a sharp distinction between investors and managers.
Even from a legal stand point, it was difficult for a partnership to replace a partner
without a consensual agreement. A feature of a corporation, instead, is a clearer
separation between investors and managers. In the context of our model, this is
captured by a shift from the environment with one-sided limited commitment to
the environment with double-sided limited commitment.
In summary, we formalize the demise of the traditional partnership as a shift to
an environment where there is more competition for managers (it is easier to fund new
business managed by financial managers) and where contracts have limited enforceability
for both investors and managers. We explore first the consequences of greater competition
for managers in the environment with double-sided limited commitment.
Proposition 5 In the environment with double-sided limited commitment, a steady state
equilibrium with a lower value of τ features:
1. Greater risk-taking, that is, higher λˆ.
2. Bigger size and higher relative productivity of the financial sector.
3. Lower stock market valuation of financial firms.
4. Greater income inequality between sectors (financial and nonfinancial) and within
the financial sector.
The first property is an immediate consequence of Proposition 2: the lower value of τ
increases the probability of a match and, consequently, it raises the incentive of managers
to exert more effort to increase their outside value.
The increase in the size of the financial sector derives in part from higher employment
and in part from higher investment. We would like to point out that, although the
increase in the share of employment would arise even if there were no contractual frictions,
the increase in investment would only arise only with contractual frictions. This is a
novel feature of our model which is key to capture the ‘productivity’ increase in the
financial sector relatively to other sectors, consistent with the pattern shown in Figure
1. According to that figure, the share of value added of the financial sector has increased
much more than the share of employment.
The third property—lower valuation of financial firms—is a direct consequence of
Lemma 3: the initial value of the contract for the manager, q¯, increases with the prob-
ability of a match ρ, which is higher in the steady state with a lower value of τ (as
already mentioned above). This effect of increased competition for managers is common
across organizational forms in which there is a division between investors and managers,
even if contracts were fully enforceable. However, the effect is likely to be stronger when
there is limited commitment also for investors. This will be shown numerically in the
quantitative simulation.
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Finally, the fourth property—greater inequality—follows from the first property, that
is, from the higher investment λˆ. As we have seen in Lemma 4, a higher value of λˆ
increases human capital accumulation and inequality within the financial sector. At
the same time, since workers that remain employed in the nonfinancial sector do not
accumulate human capital while the human capital of workers employed in the financial
sector grow faster on average, we have greater income inequality between the two sectors.
The next question is how the equilibrium properties are affected by the second impli-
cation of the structural change, that is, a shift from an environment with one-sided limited
commitment to an environment with double-sided limited commitment. We character-
ize the effects numerically since the consequences of this shift cannot be characterized
analytically.
4.1 Quantitative analysis
We calibrate the model annually using data for the 2000s. Since in the 2000s the part-
nership form of organization was no longer dominant in the financial sector, we calibrate
the model under the environment with double-sided limited commitment.
The only functional form that has not been specified is the production function in
the financial sector. We assume a quadratic form, that is, y(λ) = 1 − λ2. Therefore,
if a worker devotes all of her time to production (λ = 0), each unit of human capital
produces one unit of output. If instead the worker allocates all of her time to innovating
(λ = 1), production is zero.
Given the specification of preferences and technology and after normalizing the initial
human capital h0 to 1, there are 9 parameters to calibrate (see the top section of Table
1). Given the difficulty of calibrating the parameter of the matching function η, it is
customary to set it to η = 0.5. We follow the same approach here even though in our
model jobs are created through matching only in the financial sector. We are then left
with 8 parameters which we calibrate using the 8 moments listed in the bottom section
of Table 1.
The first 5 moments come from direct empirical observations or typical calibration
targets. An interest rate of 4% is standard in the calibration of macroeconomic models.
A lifetime of 40 years corresponds to an approximate duration of working life. The em-
ployment and value added shares are the approximate numbers for finance and insurance
in the 2000s as shown in Figure 1. The inequality index comes from the 2010 Survey of
Consumer Finance for the sample of managerial occupations in the financial sector (see
Figure 2 for a more detailed description of the data). The last three moments (innovation
time, job finding rate and job filling rate) are not based on direct empirical observations
and the values assigned are somewhat arbitrary. A sensitivity analysis will clarify the
relevance of these calibration targets. Appendix G provides a detailed description of how
the 8 moments are mapped into the 8 parameters.
Results. Our goal is to assess the quantitative impact of greater competition and lower
contract enforcement. The impact of higher competition is captured by looking at the
equilibrium consequences of reducing the vacancy cost τ . The impact of lower enforce-
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Table 1: Parameters and calibration moments.
Parameters
βˆ Discount factor 0.962
ω Death probability 0.025
z Productivity in the nonfinancial sector 0.731
ψ Fraction of workers searching for financial jobs 0.042
p Probability of successful innovation 0.035
α Utility parameter for dis-utility innovation effort 0.139
τ Cost of posting a vacancy in the financial sector 0.174
A Matching productivity 0.500
η Matching share parameter (pre-set) 0.500
Calibration moments
Interest rate 0.04
Life expectancy of workers 40.00
Employment share in finance 0.04
Value added share in finance 0.08
Inequality index (coeff. variation) in financial sector 2.00
Time allocated to innovation in finance 0.30
Probability of finding an occupation in finance 0.50
Probability of filling a vacancy 0.50
ment is captured by looking at the changes induced by a shift from the environment with
one-sided limited commitment to the environment with double-sided limited commit-
ment. We see the environment with one-sided limited commitment and higher vacancy
cost as characterizing the financial sector in the pre-1980s period. The environment with
double-sided limited commitment and lower vacancy cost is representative of recent years.
Since the vacancy cost τ has been calibrated using the 2000s data, for the pre-1980s
period we have to assign a higher number that, ideally, we would like to pin down using
some calibration target. Since it is difficult to identify such a target, we start with the
assumption that in the pre-1980s period the cost was 50% higher.
Figure 5 plots the steady state policy λ = ϕλ(q) in the environments with one-sided
and double-sided limited commitment, and for two values of τ . In the environment
with one-sided limited commitment, more competition (lower τ) reduces slightly the
investment λ (although the change is so small that it is difficult to see in the graph).
This is because, as shown in Table 2, the probability of receiving offers increases with
more competition. Since this raises the outside value of managers, a larger share of the
return must be shared with managers, making the investment less attractive for investors.
All of this is consistent with Proposition 1.
In contrast, when neither managers nor investors can commit, more competition in-
duces more innovation, as Proposition 2 predicts. Also in this environment the probability
of external offers increases, which raises the external value of managers and makes invest-
ment less attractive for investors. In order to implement the optimal λ, investors would
need to promise adequate future compensation. The problem is that future promises are
not credible with double-sided limited commitment and the only way managers can in-
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Figure 5: Steady state investment policies for different τ in the environments with one-
sided and double-sided limited commitment.
crease their contract value is by raising their outside value. This is achieved by choosing
higher λ. With a lower τ , the probability of an external offer ρ increases. Since the
manager benefits from higher innovation only if she receives an external offer, the higher
probability ρ raises the manager’s incentive to choose a higher value of λ.
So far we have shown that the organizational change that took place in the financial
sector induced more risk-taking. We now show that they also generated other changes
that are consistent with the observations we highlighted in the introduction. Table 2
shows that the shift to an environment with double-sided limited commitment and lower
τ is associated with an insignificant change in the share of employment in the financial
sector but a significant increase in the share of output. The output share increases from
6.5% to 8%.
Another important prediction of the model is that the shift is associated with a
reduction in the (average) value of investors, relative to human capital. Since we do not
have physical capital, we use human capital as a proxy for the book value of assets.12
Table 2 also shows that the initial investor’s value and the probability of filling a vacancy
are both lower. This follows directly from Lemma 3 and the free entry condition φ(q¯) ·
v(q¯) = τ after the reduction in the vacancy cost τ .
Table 2 also shows why the investor’s commitment to a long-term contract can be
weakened by competition. As expected, an increase in competition for managers results
in a redistribution in favour of the managers, independently of the level of commitment.
However, at any level of competition, a move from one-sided to two-sided limited com-
mitment increases the normalised ex-post value of the investor, Ev(q); and, even more,
the non-normalized ex-post value since growth is higher. Therefore, the investor maybe
tempted to recover his ex-post relative losses due to increased competition by reneging on
his commitments. Such a move to a double-sided limited commitment economy may re-
12This would be the case if we explicitly introduce capital and assume that there is complementarity
between human and physical capital.
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Table 2: Steady state properties of equilibria associated with different values of τ in the
environments with one-sided and double-sided limited commitment.
One-sided Double-sided
limited limited
commitment commitment
Low competition (τ = 0.261)
Average value of λ 0.151 0.242
Offer probability, ρ 0.445 0.441
Filling probability, φ 0.561 0.567
Share of employment financial sector 0.040 0.040
Share of output financial sector 0.065 0.073
Earnings in the nonfinancial sector 0.731 0.731
Earnings in the financial sector 1.110 1.257
Initial investor value v¯ 0.464 0.460
Average investor value Ev(q) 0.581 0.716
Within inequality fin sector 0.056 0.369
Between inequality fin sector 0.071 0.313
Coefficient of variation 0.356 0.826
High competition (τ = 0.174)
Average value of λ 0.147 0.300
Offer probability, ρ 0.497 0.500
Filling probability, φ 0.503 0.500
Share of employment financial sector 0.040 0.040
Share of output financial sector 0.065 0.080
Earnings in the nonfinancial sector 0.731 0.731
Earnings in the financial sector 1.116 1.388
Initial investor value v¯ 0.388 0.348
Average investor value Ev(q) 0.442 0.537
Within inequality fin sector 0.054 3.110
Between inequality fin sector 0.069 0.890
Coefficient of variation 0.351 2.000
duce the investor’s initial value (as Table 2 shows), but definitively increase his expected
value ex-post.
The above properties are consistent with the observed expansion of the financial sector
and the decline in market valuation of financial institutions, relative to other sectors, as
shown in Figure 3. The model also generates an increase in income inequality between
the financial and nonfinancial sectors and within the financial sector, consistent with the
evidence provided in Figures 1 and 2.
5 Conclusion
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 has brought attention to the growth in size and im-
portance of the financial sector over the past few decades, as well as the increase in risk
taking by financial managers. Much attention has also been placed on the extremely high
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compensation of financial professionals. Why did these trends emerge over this period
of time? In this paper we have argued that changes in the organizational structure of
financial firms have increased competition for managerial skills and weakened the en-
forcement of contractual relationships between managers and investors13. These changes
could have also played an important role in another widely documented trend occurred
during the same period—the increase in income inequality.
The fact that inequality has increased over time, especially in anglo-saxon countries,
is well documented (e.g. Saez and Piketty (2003)). The increase in inequality has been
particularly steep for managerial occupations in financial industries (e.g. Bell and Van
Reenen (2010)). In this paper we propose one possible explanation for this change. We
emphasize the increase in competition for human talent that followed the organizational
changes in the financial sector. In an industry where the enforcement of contractual rela-
tions is limited, the increase in competition raises the managerial incentives to undertake
risky investments. Although risky innovations may have a positive effect on aggregate
production, the equilibrium outcome may not be efficient and generates greater income
inequality. The higher competition for managerial talent seems consistent with the evi-
dence that managerial turnover, although not explicitly modelled in the paper, has also
increased during the last thirty years.
We have shown these effects through a dynamic general equilibrium model with long-
term contracts, subject to different levels of commitment and enforcement. The model
features two sectors—financial and nonfinancial—with innovations taking place only in
the financial sector. Of course, the assumption that only the financial sector innovates is
a simplification that we made to keep the model tractable and the analysis focused. An
alternative interpretation of the model is that the financial sector represents the collec-
tion of the most ‘innovative segments’ of the economy, financial and nonfinancial, where
similar contractual frictions emerge and the type of organizational changes described in
the paper could have similar effects.
In this sense, our model is general and has general prescriptions. When organi-
zations are subject to external competition—with different effects on members of the
organization—competition is likely to distort internal decisions and result in redistri-
bution of ex-post rents. With enough commitment (in our model: one-sided limited
commitment), the organization can internalize these distortions but this does not mean
it can implement the ex-ante full-commitment allocation which makes the organization
immune to ex-post competition (with one-sided limited commitment there is lower risk-
taking in response to competition).
We described our framework as a model of the innovative financial sector for several
reasons. First, it is in the innovative financial sector where the organizational changes
described in the introduction have been more evident. Second, some of the features
of this sector—that our model helps to explain—are less present in other sectors (for
example, the relatively low book value). Third, as in our model, it is the financial sector
where managerial talent is the most relevant factor of production and it is particularly
inalienable (capital and unskilled labor play a more relevant role in other innovative
13See Footnotes 6 and 9 for a brief reference to alternative explanations.
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sectors and patents on financial instrument are rare avis and difficult to enforce).14
It can be argued that modern financial organizations have many credible instruments
(bonuses, etc.) to overcome the investor’s commitment problem and, therefore, that our
model with two-sided limited commitment is a poor description of innovative financial
firms. But we have explicitly chosen to work with a simplified model in order to sharpen
the key mechanism that emerges in the presence of limited commitment. Sophisticated
compensation packages for CEOs and financial managers are just partial forms of limited
commitment compared to the internal compensation schemes that dominated in the
previous organizational form, that is, the traditional partnership.15
14Although these differences with other innovative sectors may be a question of degree “But perhaps
the most significant change has been to human capital. Recent changes in the nature of organizations,
the extent and requirements of markets, and the availability of financing have made specialized human
capital much more important, and also much more mobile. But human capital is inalienable, and power
over it has to be obtained through mechanisms other than ownership”. Rajan and Zingales (2000).
15“The highest incomes and the largest fortunes in the financial sector were made by investing one’s
money—in other words, as a partner of a private bank rather than as a manager of a joint stock bank.”
Cassis (2013).
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Appendices
A The Traditional Partnership Problem
The Traditional Partnesrship form does not fit easily into the contracting structure that
we use to characterize incentives in modern fiancial firms. We model the traditional
partnership as a representative partner of the partnership, who makes the investment
decisions and who is the unique claimant of the investment rents. To make it as close
as possible to our two-agent contract, we consider that the representative partner has
the same preferences of our manager and we maintain the same timing of the decisions;
however, now Ct+1 is the consumption of representative partner at the beginning of period
t + 1 (i.e. the partner only consumes out of her returns from the investment; except
for period zero, for which we assume her consumption being given). The single agent
representation implies that there are no problems of breaking the contract or distorting
the investment decision; therefore, we do not need to account for incentive constraints
and, to simplify, we do not model her outside options.
The traditional partnership problem takes the form:
V P (ht) = max
λt
{βu(y(λt)ht)− e(λt) + βEtV P (ht+1)} (29)
s.t. ht+1 = g(λt, εt+1)ht.
which results in the following Euler’s equation:
β2Etu
′(Ct+2)y(λ∗t+1)gλ(λ
∗
t , εt+1)ht ≤ −βu′(Ct+1)y′(λ∗t )ht + e′(λ∗t ), (30)
with equality if λ∗t > 0.
If we assume that the partner has log utility preferences for consumption, (30) sim-
plifies to:
pβ2(1 + λ∗t )
−1 ≤ −β y
′(λ∗t )
y(λ∗t )
+ e′(λ∗t ) (31)
If, in addition, we use the functional forms e(λ) = −α(1−λ) and y(λ) = 1−λ2, then
(31) simplifies to
pβ2 ≤ f(λ) ≡ α+ λ(2 + α)
1− λ . (32)
Since f(0) = α and f ′(λ) > 0, it follows that if pβ2 < α then λ∗t = 0, while if pβ2 > α
then there is a unique λ∗t ∈ (0, 1). In particular, if we use the parameterisation of our
calibration pβ2 < α and, therefore, the optimal investment decision for the corresponding
traditional partnership is λ∗t = 0.
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B Proof of Proposition 1
In order to prove Proposition 1, first notice that the contractual Problem (9) takes the
following form when it is normalised by h:
min
χ,γ(ε′)
max
c,λ
{
βy(λ)− c+ µ
(
u(ch)− e(λ)
)
− χ
(
e(λ)− e(λˆ)
)
+βE
[
v(µ′)g(λ, ε′) +
(
µ+ χ+ γ(ε′)
)
Q(h′, µ′)
−χD
(
h, g(λˆ, ε′)h, ρ
)
− γ(ε′)D(h, h′, ρ)
]}
s.t. h′ = g(λ, ε′)h, µ′ =
(
µ+ χ+ γ(ε′)
)
/g(λ, ε′),
and the corresponding first-order condition with respect to λ is given by (11):
(µ+ χ) eλ(λ)− βyλ(λ) ≥ βE
[(
v
(
µ′
)
+
(
µ+ χ+ γ(ε′)
)
Qh(h
′, µ′)
−γ(ε′)D2
(
h, h′, ρ
) )
ε′
]
.
An increase in ρ, before λ is chosen, has a direct effect on the enforcement constraint when
γt(εt+1) > 0 and it is given by D2,3 (h, h
′, ρ). By the definition of D, (3), D2,3 > 0 and,
therefore, this direct effect of the enforcement constraint makes investment more costly.
Furhtermore, an increase in ρ, by making the incentive and enforcement constraints
tighter, increases the value of the respective multipliers – possibly, from zero to a positive
value – since D3 > 0, which in turn increases µ
′. The simple effect on the multipliers
it’s already accounted for, by the same constraints. That is, increasing χ results in
βE
[
Qh(h
′, µ′)ε′
]
− eλ(λ) − βyλ(λ) ≤ 0, where the inequality follows from the fact that
otherwise χ = 0; similarly, increasing γ(ε′) results in Qh(h′, µ′)−D2 (h, h′, ρ) ≤ 0. There
only remain the effects of increasing µ′, which are given by v′ (µ′) < 0 and Qh,µ. Therefore
if, as we assume, Qh,µ ≤ 0, the effect of an increase in ρ is, unambiguously, a lower optimal
λ∗.
Comment to Proposition 1. The assumption Qh,µ ≤ 0 may not hold and the
result of Proposition 1 remain the same, since the effect on Qh,µ is likely to be dominated
by the other unambiguous effects. Nevertheless, the assumption is fairly general: it only
says that the increase in the manager’s value due to an increase in h is not complemented
by an additional increase when µ also raises. In particular, if the manager has CRRA
preferences for consumption, of the form
u(C) =
C1−σ
1− σ
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the optimal consumption policy, (10), takes the form: (ch)−σ = (hµ)−1; that is,
u (hµ) =
(hµ)
1−σ
σ
1− σ ,
and, therefore,
uh,µ (hµ) =
1− σ
σ2
(hµ)
1−2σ
σ .
In sum, uh,µ (hµ) ≤ 0 if and only if σ ≥ 1; i.e. if and only if the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution is less or equal one. Otherwise, if 1/σ > 1 the optimal contract will tend
to lower current consumption in exchange for compensating the manager in the future
with Qh,µ (hµ) > 0. Notice that, given the separability between consumption and effort
Q inherits its differentiability properties from u (we abstract from some technicalities in
making this claim). We analyse in detail the particular case of σ = 1; i.e. Qh,µ (hµ) = 0.
C The first-order conditions of Problem (18)
Let µ and γ(ε) be the lagrange multipliers associated with the promise-keeping constraint
and the enforcement constraint. Then the lagrangian can be written as
v(q) = βy(λ)− c+ β
∑
ε
g(λ, ε)v
(
q(ε)
)
p(ε)
+ µ
{
ln(c) + α ln(1− λ) + β
∑
ε
[
B ln
(
g(λ, ε)
)
+ q(ε)
]
p(ε)− q
}
+ χ
{
α ln(1− λ) + β
∑
ε
[
B ln
(
g(λ, ε)
)
+ q(ε)
]
p(ε)−D
}
+ β
∑
ε
[
q(ε)− d+ (1− ρ)B ln
(
g(λ, ε)
)]
γ(ε)p(ε)
The first order conditions with respect to λ, c and q(ε) are, respectively,
βyλ(λ) + β
∑
ε
[
gλ(λ, ε)v
(
q(ε)
)
+ B
(
gλ(λ, ε)
g(λ, ε)
)(
µ+ χ+ (1− ρ)γ(ε)
)]
p(ε)− α(µ+ χ)
1− λ = 0
−1 + µ
c
= 0
g(λ, ε)vq
(
q(ε)
)
+
(
µ+ χ+ γ(ε)
)
= 0
Substituting the envelope condition vq(q) = −µ and using the functional forms of
y(λ) and g(λ, ε) we obtain equations (20)-(21).
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D The posted contract
As it is well known, with directed search there is an indeterminacy of rational expectations
equilibria based on agents coordinating on arbitrary beliefs. Following the literature on
directed search, we restrict beliefs by assuming that searching managers believe that
small variations in matching value are compensated by small variations in matching
probabilities so that the expected application value remains constant. See Shi (2006).
More specifically, if Q
∗
t (h) is the value of the equilibrium contract, then for any Qt(h) in
a neighbourhood N (Q∗) of Q∗t (h), the following condition is satisfied,
ρt
(
h,Qt(h)
)
·
[
Qt(h)−Qt(h)
]
= ρt
(
h,Q
∗
t (h)
)
·
[
Q
∗
t (h)−Qt(h)
]
, (33)
where we have made explicit that the probability of a match depends on the value received
by the manager. This condition says that managers are indifferent in applying to differ-
ent employers who offer similar contracts since lower values are associated with higher
probabilities of matching. In a competitive equilibrium with directed search, investors
take Q
∗
t (h) as given and choose the contract by solving the problem
max
Qt(h)
{
φt
(
h,Qt(h)
)
· V
(
h,Qt(h)
)}
(34)
subject to (33),
where Vt(h,Q) is the value for the investor. The analysis of the optimal contract after
matching have shown that the investor’s value is a function of the value promised to the
manager. The equilibrium solution also provides the initial value of the contract for the
investor16Vt(h,Qt(h)).
For any h, if Q
′
t(h) is also the value of an equilibrium contract, the investor must
be indifferent: φt
(
h,Q
′
t(h)
)
· Vt
(
h,Q
′
t(h)
)
= φt
(
h,Q
∗
t (h)
)
· Vt
(
h,Q
∗
t (h)
)
. Therefore, we
will only consider symmetric equilibria where investors offer the same contract (h,Qt).
Furthermore, competition in posting vacancies implies that, for any level of human
capital h, the following free entry condition must be satisfied in equilibrium,
φt
(
h,Qt(h)
)
· Vt
(
h,Qt(h)
)
= τh. (35)
We can take advantage of the of the linear property of the model and normalize the above
equations. We have shown that the value of a contract for the investor is linear in h,
that is, Vt
(
h,Qt(h)
)
= vt(qt)ht. Therefore, the free entry condition can be rewritten in
normalized form as
φt(qt) · vt(q¯t) = τ. (36)
16Given the free entry condition, the ‘initial value’ for the investor is 0 and the initial value of the
contract is, in fact, his ‘interim value’, but when there is no confusion we also refer to the initial value of
the contract as the ‘initial value’.
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This takes also into account that we focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which the
probability of filling a vacancy is independent of h (which justifies the omission of h as
an explicit argument in the probability φt)
17.
The investor’s problem (34) can be rewritten as
qt = arg maxq
{
φt(q) · vt(q)
}
subject to
ρt(q)(q − qt) = ρt(q¯∗t )(q¯∗t − qt), ∀q ∈ N (q¯∗t )
We can solve for the normalized initial utility q¯t by deriving the first order condition
which can be rearranged as
1− η = −v
′
t(q¯t)(q¯t − qt)
vt(q¯t)− v′t(q¯t)(q¯t − qt)
. (37)
The right-hand side is the share of the surplus (in utility terms) going to the manager.
Thus, the manager receives the fraction 1− η of the surplus created by the match.
We now turn to Lemma 3, which is a special case of a more general result we prove
here. Let v(q¯) denote the elasticity of the investor’s value function; i.e. v(q¯) ≡ −v
′(q¯)q¯
v(q¯) .
Our log-linear specification implies that v′(q¯) > 0.
Lemma 3A v′(q¯) > 0 implies q¯′(ρ) > 0.
The optimality condition (37) can be written as
1− η
η
= v(q¯)
q¯ − q
q¯
. (38)
In a stationary equilibrium, using (26) we obtain:
q¯ − q = q¯ − {ln(1) + β [(1− ρ)q + ρq¯]}
= (1− β) q¯ + β(1− ρ) (q¯ − q)
= (1− β (1− ρ))−1 (1− β) q¯;
17In equilibrium only skilled workers who have never been employed in the financial sector will be
actively searching. Since they have never been employed in the financial sector, they all have human
capital h0. For determining the probability of a match when a financial manager decides to quit, we
incur the problem that the number of posted vacancies is discrete. In this case we assume that investors
randomize over the posting of a vacancy that is targeted at a manager with human capital h.
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therefore
v(q¯) =
1− η
η
q¯
q¯ − q
=
1− η
η
(1− β (1− ρ))
(1− β) .
Taking derivatives with respect to ρ,
v
′
(q¯)q¯
′(ρ) =
1− η
η
β
1− β > 0;
it follows that q¯′(ρ) > 0 if v′(q¯) > 0.
E The numerical solution
We describe first the numerical procedure used to solve Problem (18) for exogenous
outside values q and q and for exogenous probability of offers ρ. We will then describe
how these variables are determined in the steady state equilibrium.
Solving the optimal contract. The iterative procedure is based on the guesses for
two functions
µ = ψ(q)
v = Ψ(q).
The first function returns the multiplier γ (derivative of investor’s value) as a function of
the promised utility. The second function gives us the investor value v also as a function
of the promised utility.
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Given the functions ψ(q) and Ψ(q), we can solve the system
β
[
v
(
q(1)
)
+
( B
1 + λ
)(
µ+ χ+ (1− ρ)γ(1)
)]
p = −βyλ(λ) + α(γ + χ)
1− λ (39)
c = γ (40)
g(λ, ε)ψ
(
q(ε)
)
= µ+ χ+ γ(ε) (41)
v = βy(λ)− c+ β
∑
ε
g(λ, ε)Ψ
(
q(ε)
)
p(ε) (42)
q = ln(c) + α ln(1− λ) + β
∑
ε
(
B ln
(
g(λ, ε)
)
+ q(ε)
)
p(ε) (43)
χ
{
α ln(1− λ) + β
∑
ε
[
q(ε) + B ln
(
g(λ, ε)
)]
p(ε)
−α ln(1− λˆ)− β
∑
ε
[
(1− ρ)q + ρq¯ + ρB ln
(
g(λˆ, ε)
)]
p(ε)
}
= 0 (44)
γ(ε)
[
q(ε)− (1− ρ)q − ρq¯ + (1− ρ)B ln
(
g(λ, ε)
)]
= 0 (45)
The first three equations are the first order conditions with respect to λ, c, q(ε),
respectively. Equation (42) defines the value for the investor and equation (43) is the
promise-keeping constraint. Equations (44) and (45) formalize the Kuhn-Tucker condi-
tions for the incentive-compatibility and enforcement constraints.
Notice that equations (44) and (45) must be satisfied for all values of ε which can
take two values. Therefore, we have a system of 9 equations in 9 unknowns: λ, c, v, µ,
χ, q(ε), γ(ε). Once we have solved for the unknowns we can update the functions ψ(q)
and Ψ(q) using the solutions for v and µ.
Solving for the steady state equilibrium. The iteration starts by guessing the
steady state values of q¯ and ρ. Given these two values, we can determine q using equation
(26). With these guesses we can solve for the optimal contract as described above. This
returns the functions µ = ψ(q) and v = Ψ(q) in addition to λ = ϕλ(q) and q(ε) = ϕq(q, ε).
Once we have these functions we determine the new values of q¯ and ρ using the
free-entry condition (36) and the bargaining condition (37). We keep iterating until
convergence, that is, the guessed values of q¯ and ρ are equal to the computed values (up
to a small approximation error).
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F Derivation of the inequality index
In each period there are different cohorts of active managers who have been employed
for j periods. Because managers die with probability ω, the fraction of active managers
in the j cohort (composed of managers employed for j periods) is equal to ω(1 − ω)j .
Denote by hj the human capital of a manager who have been employed for j periods.
Since human capital grows at the gross rate g(λˆ, ε), we have that hj = h0Π
j
t=1g(λˆ, εt).
Of course, this differs across mangers of the same cohort because the growth rate is
stochastic. The average human capital is then computed as
h¯ = ω
∞∑
j=0
(1− ω)jEjhj , (46)
where Ej averages the human capital of all agents in the j-cohort. Because growth rates
are serially independent, we have that Ejhj = h0Eg(λˆ, ε)
j . Substituting in the above
expression and solving we get
h¯ =
h0ω
1− (1− ω)Eg(λˆ, ε) .
We now turn to the variance which is calculated as
Var(h) = ω
∞∑
j=0
(1− ω)jEj(hj − h¯)2.
This can be rewritten as
Var(h) = ω
∞∑
j=0
(1− ω)j
(
Ejh
2
j − h¯2
)
.
Using the serial independence of the growth rates, we have that Ejh
2
j = h
2
0[Eg(λˆ, ε)
2]j .
Substituting and solving we get
Var(h) =
h20ω
1− (1− ω)Eg(λˆ, ε)2 − h¯
2
To compute the inequality index we simply divide the variance by h¯2, where h¯ is given
by (46). This returns the inequality index (27).
To separate the within and between components of the inequality index, let’s first
rewrite the formula for the variance of h as follows:
Var(h) = ω
∞∑
j=0
(1− ω)j
[
(Ejh
2
j − h¯2j )− (h¯2j − h¯2)
]
,
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where h¯j = Ejhj = h0Eg(λˆ, ε)
j is the average human capital for the j cohort. Substitut-
ing the expression for hj and h¯j and solving we get
Var(h) =
(
h2ω
1− (1− ω)Eg(λˆ, ε)2 −
h2ω
1− (1− ω)(Eg(λˆ, ε))2
)
+(
h2ω
1− (1− ω)(Eg(λˆ, ε))2 − h¯
2
)
Dividing by h¯2 using the expression for h¯ derived in (46), we are able to write the
inequality index as
Inequality index =
(
[1− (1− ω)Eg(λˆ, ε)]2
ω[1− (1− ω)Eg(λˆ, ε)2] −
[1− (1− ω)Eg(λˆ, ε)]2
ω[1− (1− ω)(Eg(λˆ, ε))2]
)
+(
[1− (1− ω)Eg(λˆ, ε)]2
ω[1− (1− ω)(Eg(λˆ, ε))2] − 1
)
(47)
The first term is the within cohorts inequality while the second term is the between
cohorts inequality. Both terms are strictly increasing in λˆ.

G Calibration
We use the 8 moments reported in the bottom section of Table 1 to calibrate 8 parameters.
The mapping from the moments to the parameters is as follows:
• βˆ is pinned down by the interest rate target, that is, 1/βˆ − 1 = 0.04.
• ω is pinned down by the average life expectancy, that is, 1/ω = 40. Given the
calibration of βˆ, in the model we use the discount factor β = (1− ω)βˆ = 0.9375.
• ψ is pinned down by the employment share in the financial sector together with
the job finding rate in the sector, the probability ρ. Denote by S the number of
workers employed in the nonfinancial sector and by U the number of workers with
managerial ability, also employed in the nonfinancial sector. These workers flow
into financial occupations at rate ρ, replacing financial managers who die at rate
ω. Therefore, the number of financial managers evolves according to 1 − St+1 =
(1 − St)(1 − ω) + U(1 − ω)ρt+1. The equivalent flow equation for workers with
managerial ability is Ut+1 = Ut(1 − ω)(1 − ρ) + ωψ. After imposing steady state
conditions, the two flow equations can be solved for
ψ =
(ρ+ ω − ρω)(1− S)
ρ(1− ω) ,
where S has been determined by the employment share in the financial sector, ρ is
a calibration target and ω has already been determined above.
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• p is pinned down by the inequality index (coefficient of variation) in the financial
sector. Section 3 has derived the inequality index in the financial sector as the
square of the coefficient of variation in the cross sectional distribution of earn-
ings. In the model with double-sided limited commitment the index can be derived
analytically and takes the form
Inequality index =
[1− (1− ω)Eg(λˆ, ε)]2
ω[1− (1− ω)Eg(λˆ, ε)2] − 1.
The coefficient of variation is just the square root of this index. Because ε ∈ {0, 1},
we have that Eg(λˆ, ε) = 1 + pλˆ and Eg2(λˆ, ε) = 1 + 2pλˆ + p2λˆ2. Therefore, the
coefficient of variation is only a function of ω, λˆ and p. We can then use the
calibrated value of ω and the targeted value of λˆ to pin down p.
• α is pinned down by the time spent innovating. In the model with double-sided
limited commitment this maximizes the outside value of the manager and it is
determined by the first order condition (17), that is, α/(1− λˆ) = ρβBp/(1 + λˆ).
• z is pinned down by the share of value added in the financial sector. First, in
Section 3 we have derived the average human capital which is equal to
h¯ = h0
[
ω
1− (1− ω)Eg(λˆ, ε)
]
The output produced in the financial sector is (1 − S)h¯(1 − λˆ2) and the output
produced in the nonfinancial sector is zh0S. We can then determine z imposing
that the output share of the financial sector is 8%.
• Finally, the parameters A and τ are pinned down by the probability of filling a
vacancy and the probability of finding occupation in the financial sector. More
specifically, we have ρ = AX0.5U−0.5 and φ = AX−0.5U0.5. Given the calibration
targets ρ and φ and the value of S determined above, we can use these two equations
to solve for A. The free entry condition τ = φv¯ will then determine τ . Notice that,
after imposing the targeted probabilities ρ and φ, we can solve for the steady state
and, therefore, for the value of v¯ without the need of pre-setting the parameter τ .
This parameter will then be determined residually without iteration.
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